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The G20 OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives reforms impose large collateral/liquidity demands 
on clearing members of Central Counterparty (CCP) clearing platforms in the form of initial 
margins, variation margins and contributions to the default fund. In Heath et al.  (2016), 
it was shown how this introduces a trade-off between liquidity risk and solvency risk with 
the system manifesting considerable systemic risk from these two sources of risk while CCP 
penetration is at current levels. We extend this analysis to include the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) skin-in-the-game requirements for CCPs, which aim to 
ameliorate the contributions to the default fund by clearing members and also to prevent 
moral hazard problems associated with the too-interconnected-to-fail (TITF) status of CCPs 
as more and more derivatives are centrally cleared. We provide a systemic risk assessment 
of these features of the OTC derivatives reforms using network analysis based on 2015-end 
data on the derivatives positions for 40 globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs).
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1| G20 over‑the‑counter derivatives 
(OTC‑D) markets reform in perspective
One of the key manifestations of the 2007 Great 
Financial Crisis (GFC) arose from the activities 
of large financial institutions (FIs) in derivatives 
markets, with credit default swaps being strongly 
implicated in the crisis. There was a threat of 
financial contagion when the American Insurance 
Group (AIG) suffered escalating margin calls on 
derivatives positions, and as the value of underlying 
assets plummeted, it simultaneously faced failure 
from solvency and liquidity problems. This led 
to an unprecedented bailout package for AIG by 
the US Treasury of over USD 85 billion, which 
included USD 35 billion in collateral payments 
to its counterparties and USD 30 billion for 
the remaining market value of credit default 
swaps protection sold to global banks by AIG FP 
division.1 The SIGTARP audit of November 2009 
of AIG‑FP, observed that the secrecy surrounding 
counterparties in AIG’s OTC positions and the lack 
of ex ante close‑out valuation and loss allocation 
rules that authorities could apply, made it difficult 
for the US authorities to negotiate haircuts on the 
counterparties of AIG.
In this context, much has been made of the orderly and 
speedy settlement of the central counterparty (CCP) 
cleared segments of Lehman Brothers’ derivatives 
positions.2 Indeed, some salutary insights can 
be gained from the Fleming and Sarkar (2014) 
study on the Lehman Brothers failure resolution 
process, which in the case of its derivatives positions 
included both OTC and CCP components. Firstly, 
it should be noted that CCP settled derivatives 
positions for Lehman Brothers were a minuscule 
part of the USD 35 trillion in notional value of 
its OTC derivatives which accounted for 96% 
of the net worth of its derivatives. The latter 
suffered an arduous and lengthy settlement process, 
taking over five years. Fleming and Sarkar (Ibid) 
conclude that “customers of centrally cleared 
securities were generally made whole …. In contrast, 
many counterparties of Lehman Brothers’ OTC 
derivatives suffered substantial losses.” The losses 
that Lehman Brothers itself suffered on derivatives, 
as mainly big bank counterparties shielded 
themselves by not making payments on their 
out‑of‑the‑money positions and also by sequestering 
collateral posted by Lehman Brothers, were spread 
widely to other creditors. Creditors on average 
received a historically low recovery rate of 28% on 
the USD 1 trillion claims on Lehman Brothers.
Thus, in no small measure, the administrative 
eff iciency behind CCP clearing of 
Lehman Brothers’ derivatives relates to the small 
size of such claims and the scope for the bulk 
of the risk from losses to spill over elsewhere. 
This signals the need to assess systemic risk 
consequences of derivatives markets in toto, 
namely the inclusion of both OTC and CCP 
segments which co‑mingle CCPs with many 
globally systemically important banks (G‑SIBs) 
and other financial institutions (G‑SIFIs).
The GFC gave clear evidence that the large value 
of derivatives positions and the potential for 
extreme losses in their underlying asset values 
exceeded the liquid and capital resources of G‑SIFIs. 
This has brought to the forefront the regulatory 
challenge of determining and managing adequate 
liquid and capital buffers for major participants 
of these markets not only to mitigate their own 
failure, but to mitigate their contribution to 
system failure. In addition to vulnerability to 
exposures to falling assets values, the threat of 
counterparty risk from potential cascade failures of 
counterparties (see Haldane, 2009, Yellen, 2013) 
is increasingly seen as the hallmark of interconnected 
financial systems. There is a further dimension, 
which is compounded under conditions of stress, 
of having to grapple with the opacity of the 
bilaterally negotiated OTC positions (see Acharya 
and Bisin, 2013) that generate under the radar 
interconnectedness between the participants 
which involve derivatives positions and other 
components of their balance sheets. With CCPs 
novating positions with clearing members, by 
becoming a buyer to the seller and vice versa 
to the buyer, they start with a balanced book 
1 See, the US Special 
Inspector General for 
Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (SIGTARP) audit of 
November 2009 of the AIG 
Financial Product division –
http://pogoarchives.org/m/er/
sigtarp‑audit‑20091117.pdf
2 Specifically, LCH.Clearnet 
resolved USD 9 trillion in 
notional value of Lehman’s OTC 
derivatives positions, within 
three weeks, well within the 
margin held and without loss 
to other market participants. 
See “Managing the Lehman 
Brothers’ Default”, LCH.Clearnet, 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/
swaps/swapclear_for_ clearing_
members/managing_the_
lehman_brothers_default.asp 
Likewise, DTCC and CME had 
similar successes. See “DTCC 
successfully closes out Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy,” 
http:// www.
bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
aojt5wVkz_EM
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(Tucker, 2011; Heath et al., 2015) and can reduce 
interconnections in the system. In OTC markets, 
balanced positions come at the price of complex 
bilateral offsetting trades which add to the density 
of links between the G‑SIB dealers.
Hence, with the view to gaining the administrative 
efficiency of CCP settlement and to reduce the 
complexity of financial links and their lack 
of transparency, the main thrust of the G20 
financial reforms mooted at the Pittsburgh Summit 
in 2009 has been to make it mandatory for all 
standardised OTC derivatives (OTC‑D) contracts 
to be cleared through CCPs along with an extensive 
collateralisation programme for both CCP and 
bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives.
As the reliance on CCP clearing increases with the 
G20 reforms, Cœuré (2014, 2015) has famously 
called CCPs “super systemic” players. CCPs have 
begun to dominate an already crowded centrally 
clustered network structure of the global derivatives 
markets with 16 or so G‑SIBs which currently 
account for over 85% of derivatives positions3 
in the OTC domain and as clearing members 
of CCPs. The question here is can CCPs cope 
with an increased burden of clearing derivatives as 
this migrates from the OTC domain? Have CCPs 
become too interconnected to fail (TITF)? TITF 
is a euphemism relating to the moral hazard 
problem that the economic repercussions from 
failure of CCPs could be so wide ranging that 
they could become prime candidates to receive tax 
payer bailouts (see Wendt, 2015; Blackrock, 2014; 
Markose et al., 2012).
The purpose of this note is to examine frameworks 
for assessing the systemic risk from CCPs in 
derivatives markets. Specifically in view of the TITF 
status of CCPs, in Section 2, we will discuss the 
problem of determining the adequacy of CCP 
capital in the context of what is now called 
skin‑in‑the‑game (SIG) funds that are put at risk 
in the first tranche of losses to mitigate incentives 
for the CCP to free ride on the resources of clearing 
members or on those of the tax payer.
One of the highlights we provide is an assessment 
of the extant hybrid system of OTC‑D and CCPs 
using the network approach in Heath, Kelly 
et al. (2016) which is based on the BIS MAGD4 
report (2013) data on the 2012 derivatives positions 
for the 40 G‑SIBs and using a reasonable OTC‑D 
and CCP clearing spilt with five CCPs clearing 
each of the main derivatives products.5 Retaining 
the VaR method in Heath, Kelly et al. (2016), 
widely used for the calculation of initial margin 
and default fund contributions, the systemic 
risk analysis is updated to cover the 2015 end 
derivatives product level data for the 40 MAGD 
G‑SIBs. Comparisons that can be made at these 
two points of time provide interesting ballpark 
figures for the extent to which progress has been 
made in the direction of mitigating systemic 
risk in global derivatives markets. Further, the 
empirically calibrated hybrid network model 
for CCP and OTC‑D positions of 40 G‑SIBs gives 
a good basis to include the skin‑in‑the‑game capital 
funding of CCPs in addition to clearing member 
initial margin and default fund contributions to 
assess improvements in the stability properties of 
the network system. Following Alter et al. (2015), 
Markose (2012) and Heath, Kelly et al. (2016), we 
recommend the application of network centrality 
measures for CCPs to estimate the skin‑in‑the‑game 
surcharges that have the best potential to mitigate 
contagion losses from clearing member defaults 
that can be transmitted by CCPs. Sections 4 
and 5 give some empirical evidence for the size of 
the SIG funds and their effectiveness in dealing 
with TITF for CCPs clearing each of the five 
main derivatives products using the Heath, Kelly 
et al. (2016) CCP‑OTC clearing split involving 
the 40 MAGD G‑SIBs (see footnote 5).
Finally, we conclude by reiterating the call to 
arms (see Haldane, 2009; Markose, 2013) for a 
granular data driven approach of digital maps for 
the contractual obligations of G‑SIFIs, especially 
in global derivatives markets, at regular intervals of 
time.6 Only this can vitiate the unacceptable levels of 
model risk that prove a stumbling block to managing 
systemic risk in financial markets. This case was also 
3 For the 2012 data, 
Markose (2012) showed 
that this accounted for 97% 
of global derivatives in 
terms of gross notional. 
Brunnermeier et al. (2013) 
study the CDS market on EU 
reference entities and note that 
the network of bilateral CDS 
exposures among counterparties 
resembles a “core‑periphery” 
structure with the CDS market 
centred around 13 or 14 G‑SIFIs. 
Likewise, Duffie et al. (2015) 
who have bilateral CDS 
exposure data for all participants 
in the single name global CDS 
market, confirm a similar 
structure of high concentration 
of links around 13 G‑SIBs who 
dominate the CDS market.
4 This stands for the Bank 
for International Settlements 
Macroeconomic Assessment 
Group on Derivatives (MAGD) 
Report.
5 In Heath, Kelly et al. (2016), 
the hybrid OTC‑CCP split in 
derivatives clearing network 
model is called Scenario 1: 
CCP1 clears 75% of all 
interest rate derivatives; 
CCP2 clears 15% Forex 
derivatives; CCP3 clears 15 % 
equity derivatives; 
CCP4 clears 50% 
credit derivatives 
and CCP5 clears 20% 
commodity derivatives.
6 Our view is that systemic 
risk does not happen overnight 
but builds up and hence digital 
maps of extant who‑to‑whom 
obligations at reasonably 
regular intervals can alert 
authorities. The current practice 
of calibration and simulation 
exercises undertaken to provide 
reasonable replicas of the real 
world interconnections, due to a 
lack of data, can be avoided.
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made by Brunnermeier et al. (2013) on why models 
based on limited segments of G‑SIFI activities can be 
misleading and “hence from an ESRB perspective, 
a holistic view of the exposures map is required.”
2| Skin‑in‑the‑game: CCPs as “super 
systemic” or “super vulnerable”  
in a hybrid system of clearing
The regulatory reform process has set out extensive 
institutional mechanisms that ensure that CCPs 
have: (i) sufficient resources in the form of stable 
and conservative initial margins that avoid 
procyclicality by being precalibrated to meet stressed 
market conditions, (ii) higher capital charges and 
margin requirements for non‑standardisable OTC 
instruments, drawn up by BCBS and IOSCO (2013), 
and (iii) other risk management systems to deal with 
failure of clearing members (see CPSS‑IOSCO, 
2012, EMIR, 2012).
With regard to (iii) the current practice is for 
the CCP to rely on the default fund contributions 
from clearing members where the fund is calibrated 
to withstand failure of the two clearing members 
with the largest liabilities under extreme but 
plausible conditions. This goes by the name of 
Cover 2 (CPSS‑IOSCO, 2012). There are rules 
pertaining to how CCPs can mutualise losses 
of defaulting members to surviving members 
after exhausting the former’s initial margin and 
contribution to the default fund. This schedule 
of loss settlement is called the default waterfall 
structure. Rule books of CCPs include close out 
valuation process and novation procedures for 
outstanding positions of defaulting members to 
surviving members. CCPs also have so called 
assessment powers over surviving members to 
specify the replenishment of the funds used in 
the mutualised loses of the defaulting members.
As CCPs are not public utilities (Lubben, 2014) but 
private firms competing for custom, there could be a 
race to the bottom in terms of less costly margining 
requirements and default fund contributions for 
clearing members,7 and also undercapitalisation. In 
order to mitigate free riding by CCPs and moral 
hazard due to their TITF status, authorities such 
as those implementing the EMIR have included 
skin‑in‑the‑game (SIG) requirements for CCPs. 
CCP SIG is given precedence in the waterfall 
structure ahead of the loss mutualisation based 
on the prefunded default fund contributions of 
surviving CCP members. The implementation of 
formal capital requirements for CCPs will bring 
them in line with banks which are subject to 
regulatory capital requirements.8
It is customary in such regulations that some formulaic 
and absolute minimum standards are stipulated. 
European Union CCPs are required to hold a 
minimum capital buffer of EUR 7.5 million or, 
a larger sum sufficient to provide adequate cover 
against a number of risks which include credit, 
counterparty, business and operational risks. 
The latter can involve the cost of orderly winding 
down. The SIG is viewed as a surcharge on top of the 
minimum CCP capital requirement. The EMIR SIG 
rule (Reg. 153/2013 Article 35, §2) specifies 
a 25% surcharge on top of the minimum CCP 
capital requirement.
The discussions, to date, on whether the EMIR SIG 
rule of a 25% top up on minimum CCP capital 
is adequate for the job at hand have mostly taken 
a qualitative perspective or used rule of thumb. 
The size of the SIG, it has been argued, should be 
large enough as the first loss tranche in order to 
prevent the CCP from free riding on the prefunded 
margin and default fund contributions of its 
clearing members. In the case of non‑existent or 
low CCP SIG along with low initial margin and 
default fund contributions from clearing members 
to attract custom, both the CCP and its clearing 
members have or potentially can have highly 
leveraged uncollateralised positions that signal moral 
hazard problems that may require taxpayer bailout. 
Also, the CCP SIG should not be so large that the 
threat of mutualised losses becomes remote and 
can lose its power to discipline clearing members 
to control the size of their open interest.9
7 Zhu (2011) in his survey of 
a sample of CCPs does not find 
evidence of an obvious dropping 
of standards in regard to 
this. However, initial margin 
calculations differ on details 
such as length of the close 
out period for which initial 
margin is calculated. Hence, 
UK CCPs prescribe seven days 
as opposed to the five day norm 
and the former needs more 
initial margin than the latter.
8 See, BCBS 227 (DFCCP).
9 Cœuré (2015) notes 
that “the purpose of CCPs 
is to mutualise counterparty 
risk, not to remove it from 
clearing members altogether 
and bear it themselves. 
CCPs are risk poolers, 
not insurance providers”. 
The International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), 
has weighed in on the 
suitable size of CCP SIG fund. 
In response to the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) 
consultation paper, ISDA 
stated “that having a 50% 
skin‑in‑the‑game requirement 
may not strike the right 
balance between protecting 
non‑defaulting members 
and ensuring that they have 
incentives to bid competitively 
in an auction of a defaulting 
clearing member’s portfolio at 
a time when resources need 
to be replenished.”
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As in principle, the CCP operates a balanced 
book and can become a source of financial 
contagion only if the residual losses (in excess 
of the prefunded initial margin) of its defaulting 
clearing members are passed on in substantial 
amounts to non‑defaulting clearing members, we 
will argue that the role of SIG should be viewed 
as a Pigou surcharge for the TITF status of CCPs, 
namely the negative externality that they pose to 
others from their systemic vulnerability to the 
exposures of their clearing members that can arise 
from inadequate CCP capital.
3| Frameworks for assessing  
the systemic risk from CCPs  
in derivatives markets
Clearly, there has to be empirical analysis to provide 
evidence for the efficacy or not for the CCP SIG 
in conjunction with the other CCP resources such 
as the prefunded initial margin and default fund. 
There have been a number of studies that have 
attempted to provide calibration and simulation 
stress test exercises to quantify and assess the risk 
management capabilities of CCPs mostly in the 
context of the prefunded initial margin and the 
default fund rather than for CCP capital and SIG 
buffers. Typically, formulaic calculations are made 
for initial margin and default fund contributions 
and it is conceivable that CCP SIG can be made in 
a similar vein and then the stress tests are conducted 
to see, under different scenarios, how CCPs fare 
under extreme but plausible conditions. The latter 
include simultaneous defaults of several large 
clearing members (CMs). The main difference in 
the methodology of these studies lies in whether 
these stress tests are conducted with a model 
limited to a single CCP and its clearing members 
or one that can include G‑SIB positions in both 
bilateral OTC clearing and with multiple CCPs.
Table 1 summarises the key steps in such exercises.
In Step 1, after having calibrated open interest 
positions of clearing members at the CCP 
in question or within a hybrid OTC‑CCP split 
clearing model,10 the first order of business is 
to determine the initial margin requirements. 
Step 2 involves Cover 2 default fund estimates. 
For both these steps, the best practice (see Lin 
and Surti, 2015) is the conventional VaR type 
metrics that are calibrated to satisfy stress period 
10 Exceptionally, 
Duffie et al. (2015) have bilateral 
exposure data for some 30% 
of the global market of single 
name CDS. This data obtained 
from the DTCC gives a snapshot 
of this fragment of the financial 
network for 30 December 2011.
T1  Steps in systemic risk assessment in stress test models for CCP  
and OTC‑D clearing
Note: At each step, the light blue box highlights the wider liquidity stress, while the darker blue boxes indicate 
solvency risks.
Step 1 Based on bilateral open interest positions of 
derivatives market participants, determine initial margin 
collateral of OTC-D banks and as clearing members 
based on VaR type metrics precalibrated typically at 99% 
confidence level (Cij is the collateral for initial margin from i 
to j, see Box 1).
Current levels of CCP clearing 
at  35%-45% on average 
across all derivatives products 
with  CCP fragmentation 
implies high levels of collateral 
demands, Duffie and Zhu 
(2011). Heath, Kelly et al. 
(2016) show this can trigger 
liquidity contagion.
Reduces solvency risk: 
init ial  margin reduces 
uncollateralised derivatives 
exposures for both OTC 
G-SIBs and CCPs.
Heath, Kelly et  al. (2016): 
initial margins add to liquidity 
encumbrance ratio of G-SIBs 
in both OTC and CCP positions 
vis-à-vis their available high 
quality liquid assets.
Step 2 Determine Cover 2 Default Fund (DF) contributions 
of clearing members (CMs) for CCP.
Reduces Solvency Risk: 
DF provides CCPs buffers 
against exposures to clearing 
members.
Heath, Kelly et al. (2016) adds 
CM default fund contributions 
to Liquidity Encumbrance 
Ratio of CMs; New EMIR 2014 
rule permits CM to reduce 
capital of clearing members.
Step 3 Stress test with extreme mark-to-market variation 
margin conditions (this is done pairwise between participants 
i and j as in Vij , see Box 1: Vij – Cij = Uncollaterised residual 
liabilties from i to j  is a source of counterparty risk.
Interject CCP skin-in-game ahead of waterfall feature for 
mutualisation of defaulted losses on non-defaulting clearing 
member default funds.
Step  3  stress of  2.67 
and 3.89 volatility can cause 
added liquidity stress as G-SIBs 
which are clearing members of 
multiple CCPs have high liquidity 
encumbrance (Singh, 2010a 
and 2010b). Replenishment 
of default funds and VMHC can 
bring about solvency stress.
CCP skin-in-game can 
be a panacea for Too 
Interconnected To Fail moral 
hazard problem; SIG can 
forestall variation margin 
haircuts; latter are realised 
losses on derivatives assets 
and threaten insolvency.
Cover 2 default fund exhausted 
fully in Heath, Kelly et al. 
(2016) with  3.89  volatility 
stress at Step 3.
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conditions rather than use point in time estimates 
which suffer from the “paradox of volatility” (Borio 
and Drehmann, 2011; Markose, 2013; Markose 
et al., 2017). The latter, in addition to being 
procyclical, will severely underestimate the risk 
buffers needed in the run up to a financial crisis. 
Step 3 in Table 1 involves stress tests wherein 
more extreme market conditions, than for which 
prefunded buffers have been calibrated, to drive 
variation margins and hence the size of residual 
uncollateralised positions. The systemic risk 
consequences for CCPs and the liquidity and 
capital shortfalls are typically assessed by the classic 
Furfine (2003) style failure of clearing members. 
Different scenarios involving CCP infrastructure 
rules and OTC‑D and CCP clearing splits have 
been investigated.
Lin and Surti (2015) and Armakola and 
Laurent (2015) conduct detailed analyses of US 
and/or European CCPs and their specific clearing 
members.11 Armakola and Laurent (2015) 
analyse CCP resilience by conducting stress 
tests based on the capacity of clearing members, 
as determined by their ratings and default 
probabilities, to make good on their derivatives 
obligations. They conclude that in a Cover 2 
situation with a failure of two major clearing 
members, many CCPs in their sample may face 
serious liquidity problems.
In Table 1, the pale blue boxes and darker blue boxes, 
respectively, highlight the wider implications for 
liquidity and solvency systemic risks as a function of 
the size of the margin and default fund requirements 
on G‑SIBs for derivatives clearing. The main findings 
here show that the key factor in the demand for 
collateral is the extent to which counterparty 
exposures can be compressed by netting. Duffie and 
Zhu (2011)12 show that multilateral netting benefits 
from CCPs with few clearing members is limited. 
Hence, there has to be substantial migration from 
bilateral OTC to CCP and that too to a single CCP 
for all product clearing to achieve close to 40% 
counterparty exposure reduction when compared 
to the case of 100% bilateral clearing which benefits 
from multi‑product netting efficiency germane 
to OTC markets. Along the lines of Duffie and 
Zhu (2011), for instance Heller and Vause (2011) 
show that margin requirements can be reduced by 
up to 15% if both credit default swaps and interest 
rate swaps are netted by one centralised CCP.
Current levels of CCP clearing of derivatives, with 
growing fragmentation of CCPs, are estimated to 
average between 35%‑45%.13 Interestingly, our so 
called Heath, Kelly et al. (2016) Scenario 1 OTC‑D 
and  CCP clearing with the latter being along single 
product lines resembles Duffie and Zhu (2011) 
Table 3 Column 8 case which signals 20% reduction 
in counterparty exposures (see footnote 12). 
However, with collateralisation of both OTC 
and CCP exposures, Heath, Kelly et al. (2016) 
make a careful audit of the high quality liquid 
assets of the 40 MAGD G‑SIBs and find that 
some of them can suffer liquidity encumbrance 
of over 87% as a result of their collateral 
commitments given in Steps 1 and 2 of Table 1. 
As pre‑funding of collateral grows, clearly residual 
uncollateralised counterparty risk from extreme 
variation margin volatility can be mitigated, but 
only at the cost of triggering a liquidity contagion 
as G‑SIBs become more and more encumbered as 
members of multiple CCPs (see Singh, 2010a, b). 
At 3.89 volatility 14 stress tests at Step 3 of Table 1, 
Heath, Kelly et al. (2016) instigate a variation 
margin hair cut (VMHC) to the winning side 
non‑defaulting clearing members of some CCPs 
as they become unbalanced from defaults of 
clearing members. They also assume that CCPs 
can in principle exhaust all the non‑defaulting 
clearing member share of the default fund if the 
losses of defaulting members exceed their initial 
margin and default fund contributions. Clearly, 
this can be considered to be highly permissive of 
free riding on the part of CCPs and can result 
in both solvency and liquidity contagion effects.
To date, perhaps with the exception of Lin and 
Surti (2015), no paper has analysed the role of CCP 
capital and SIG funds within a model in which 
initial margin and the default funds have been 
11 Lin and Surti (2015) 
study Swapclear for interest 
rates swaps and ICE for credit 
default swaps, while Armakola 
and Laurent (2015) cover 
eight European CCPs and 
five US CCPs. Their analysis 
can be compared to how CME 
conducts its stress tests: 
https://www.cmegroup.com/
clearing/risk‑management/
files/principles‑for‑ccp‑stress‑
testing.pdf
12 See Duffie and Zhu (2011) 
Table 3 column 9. Cont and 
Kokholm (2014) show that 
exposure reductions from CCP 
netting are greater than what 
Duffie and Zhu (2011) have 
estimated for high volatility 
underlying assets.
13 The 45% figure is 
given in EC Safer Financial 
Infrastructure #saferCCPs.
14 Based on daily data, this is 
only about a one in 8 year event.
117
Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante and Ali Rais Shaghaghi
A systemic risk assessment of OTC derivatives reforms and skin‑in‑the‑game for CCPs
Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 21 - April 2017 - The impact of financial reforms
quantified. Even more remarkably, despite the call 
to arms to model the interconnectedness of the 
extant financial exposures in complex derivatives 
markets (see Brunnermeier et al., 2013) virtually no 
network analytics has been brought to bear on the 
study of systemic risk or of adequacy of buffers in such 
systems. Cont (2015) succinctly notes how essential 
it is to model the links for G‑SIBs who are common 
to multiple CCPs and also the OTC connections 
between G‑SIBS to make realistic systemic risk 
assessments of these markets and infrastructure rules.
In the context of interconnected systems, we will 
follow Alter et al. (2015) and Markose (2012) 
who find that network centrality, i.e. eigenvector 
centrality, based capital allocation and bailout 
surcharges are best placed to “stabilise” the 
system. Alter et al. (2014) show that other capital 
allocation rules are less effective at preventing 
Furfine (2003) type contagion failures when 
the system is stress tested. Markose (2012) and 
Markose et al. (2017) give a more extensive 
rationale for the use of a recursively derived 
fixed point solution for the network centrality of 
financial participants in propagating contagion 
failures in the system. The principle of a Pigou 
or externalities tax that is proportionate to the 
network eigenvector centrality of the financial 
institution to mitigate its TITF was first mooted 
in Markose (2012).
4| Heath, Kelly et al. (2016 ) hybrid OTC 
and CCP global derivatives network
Table 2 gives the changes that have occurred 
in the balance sheet data for the 40 G‑SIBs 
from 2012 to 2015‑end with respect to their 
total derivatives positions, both OTC and CCP 
cleared. Firstly, note the compression in gross 
notional from about USD 755 trillion in 2012 
to USD 628.24 trillion in 2015, which is about 
a 17 % fall. More impressive is the fair value of 
derivatives payables that fell by just over a third 
from USD 14.34 trillion to USD 9.75 trillion. 
Derivatives receivables at fair value have fallen 
even more by 37% from USD 14.48 trillion 
to USD 9.05 trillion.
The share of the top 16 G‑SIBs recognised as 
global derivatives dealers was 83% in 2012 and 
this has increased to 85% in 2015. The share 
of the 16 top G‑SIBs for fair value derivatives 
receivables has remained at around the 84%‑85% 
mark while these G‑SIBs seem to have reduced 
their liabilities considerably from 85% 
in 2012 to about 70% in 2015. Tier 1 capital of 
the 40 G‑SIBs has increased from USD 2.39 trillion 
in 2012 to USD 2.63 trillion in 2015 which is 
about a 10% increase.
The 2015 initial margin and default fund 
contributions are pre‑determined as in Steps 1 
and 2 given in Table 1. This is reported below 
for 2012 and 2015 in Table 3. The estimated total 
T2  Balance Sheet Data (for 40 G‑SIBs)
(USD trillions)
2015 2012 2015 2012
All banks Top 16 core banks
Derivatives liabilities 
negative fair value 9.753 14.34 6.822 12.16
Derivatives assets 
positive fair value 9.035 14.48 7.541 12.35
Gross notional 
outstanding 628.249 755.08 534.731 633.49
Tier 1 capital 2.630 2.39 1.573 1.34
Source: 2012 financial reports data reported in Table 1 of Heath, Kelly 
et al. (2016); 2015-end data obtained from financial reports  
for each of 40 G-SIBs (from BIS MAGD).
T3  2012 and 2015 initial margin and default fund (for 40 G‑SIBs)
(USD billions)
Prefunded total initial margin Default fund
Total Bank‑bank Bank‑CCP CCP‑Bank Total Bank‑CCP
Scenario 1 
2012 MAGD G-SIBs 
derivatives data 
(Heath, Kelly et al., 2016) 920.25 892.88 37.37 0 6.95
Scenario 1 
2015 MAGD G-SIBs 
derivatives data 490.51 444.20 46.32 0 10.69
Notes: Estimates based on Heath, Kelly et al. (2016), Scenario 1, CCP-D and OTC clearing split for 40 G-SIBs 
(from BIS MAGD). 2012 data is reported in Table 5 (initial margin) and Table 6 (default fund) of Heath,  
Kelly et al. (2016).
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initial margin has fallen from USD 920.25 billion 
in 2012 to USD 490.51 billion for all five CCPs. 
What is interesting is that while the initial 
margin for bank‑bank OTC positions 
halves from USD 892.88 billion in 2012 
to USD 444.2 billion in 2015, the initial margin 
from bank‑CCP rises from USD 37.37 billion 
to USD 46.32 billon. The total default fund 
from banks to CCPs in 2012 is smaller than 
the USD 10.69 billion in 2015. This follows the 
trend in initial margins as well. The break downs 
for the default fund for each of the five CCPs will 
be reported in the next section.
Following Step 3 of Table 1, the so‑called stability 
matrix based on the residual uncollateralised variation 
margins (see Box 1) is derived for stresses modelled 
at 2.6 volatility in the underlying. The stability 
matrix and the systemic risk analytics for the global 
derivatives network are given Box 1.
Chart 1 characterises the hybrid elements of the 
extant global derivatives markets with 16 G‑SIBs 
dominating in both CCP derivatives clearing 
and also in the OTC markets, while the 
remaining 24 occupy the outermost tier of the 
network. The important feature of Scenario 1, 
as noted by Cont (2015) as being significant 
for realistic systemic risk assessments of CCPs, 
is the presence of common clearing members. 
Failure of a clearing member in one CCP will 
have implications for all others.15
The network analytics of systemic importance and 
vulnerability are based, respectively, on the right 
eigenvector centrality and left eigenvector centrality 
of the hybrid derivatives network described in Box 1. 
These resemble Google page rank statistics and 
are recursively obtained to establish a relationship 
between network participants in that a player is 
systemically important (vulnerable) not only because 
it has large liabilities (exposures) to counterparties but 
also because it is connected to other central players.
When comparing the 2012 MAGD‑based derivatives 
network (see Heath; Kelly et al., 2016, Chart 5), with 
Chart 2 for 2015, there are considerable changes in the 
centrality positions. In 2015, European G‑SIBs have 
15 Cont (2015) states:“If one 
of these dealer banks defaults 
on its margin calls in one of 
the CCPs, it will simultaneously 
default on its positions in 
all CCPs of which it is a member, 
leading to possible draws on the 
default fund of one 
or more CCPs.”
C1 2015 40 MAGD G‑SIBS and hybrid derivatives clearing by CCPs and OTC (Scenario 1) 
Net payable Net receivable In-Core Mid-Core0.9 Out-Core Periphery0.7 0.7 update
Note: CCP1 (clears 75% interest rate); CCP2 (clears 15% Forex); CCP3 (clears 15 % equity); CCP4 (clears 50% credit); CCP5 (clears 20% commodity) 
The arrow starts from the FI making the net derivatives payables with the arrow head ending with the counterparty who is exposed to the former.
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taken the place that US G‑SIBs held in the 2012 data 
for being most systemically important, see Chart 2a.
The systemic importance of CCP1 which 
clears interest rate derivatives is ranked 4th 
after 3 G‑SIBs. A single net bilateral payable flow 
prominent in Chart 1 from CCP1 to Nomura is 
material here and this also shows up in the high 
ranking of Nomura in the vulnerability index. 
The greatest vulnerability in terms of the left 
eigenvector centrality is seen in CCP4 (credit) 
and CCP5 (commodity) in Chart 2b. The case 
of CCP5 reflects recent conditions regarding the 
high volatility in commodities markets.
5| Skin‑in‑the‑game (SIG) fund 
calibration using spectral 
stability methods
A network system can be viewed as a dynamical 
system in which some network configurations 
or topologies determined by the distribution of 
links and weights of links between nodes give the 
potential for the network to be prone to cascade 
failures from arbitrary sized shocks. When systems 
fall into some regions of network configurations, 
they can become unstable and tip over. Box 1 
shows how classical spectral methods given by the 
maximum eigenvalue (�max) of an appropriately 
constructed matrix representing snap shots for the 
network configuration of extant financial obligations 
of major financial institutions to counterparties 
relative to their buffers, can give the tipping 
point. Given the size of derivatives payables and 
the bilateral exposures faced by counterparties, 
regulators are concerned about the adequacy of 
the buffers that can be used. The point up to 
which these buffers can be eroded by losses is the 
so called regulatory loss threshold (denoted by ρ) 
when financial institutions are deemed to be in a 
state of distress. The question is how can network 
systems be constrained to stay in the stable region 
determined by the maximum eigenvalue of the 
stability matrix in Box 1 and loose no more capital 
than the given (%) regulatory loss threshold?
In Heath, Kelly et al. (2016) it is assumed that 
a G‑SIB should be limited to using only 10% 
of its Tier 1 capital as a buffer against exposures 
C2  Centrality measures for systemic importance and vulnerability of hybrid derivatives network for 40 MAGD global banks 
and CCPs (2015) (Top 20)
a)  Right eigenvector centrality:  
measure of systemic importance
b)  Left eigenvector centrality:  
measure of systemic vulnerability
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1 Barc
2 SocGen
3 Deutsche
4 CCP1
5 Intesa
6 Mitsubishi
7 JP Morgan
8 Goldman
19 Dexia
10 Rabo
11 Nordea
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13 CredAgri
14 DZ
15 BoA
16 Lloyds
17 CredSui
18 RBS
19 Citi
20 BancoSan
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8 Goldman
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13 BNP
14 JP Morgan
15 Citi
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17 Bar
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19 Commer
20 BoA
Note: These have been normed by the largest centrality values.
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Box 1
Network based spectral systemic risk analytics for 40 G‑SIB  
and CCP based global derivatives markets
In the hybrid case, derivatives are cleared both bilaterally by banks in an OTC setting and also centrally with 
separate CCPs, one for each of the derivatives products. We assume that there are B+c financial institutions, 
where B is the number of banks (40 in the MAGD G-SIB data) and c = 1, 2, ..,5 are the number of CCPs, 
in Scenarios 1 of Heath, Kelly et al. (2016). The “stability matrix” Θ in (1) is instrumental for giving the 
Spectral Systemic Risk analytics derived below and it is based on the representation of the extant contractual 
obligations of the major participants and also of their relevant resources is a (B+c )×(B+c ) matrix1 as follows:
0
V
12
 – C
12 
K
2
⋯ 0 0 ⋯
V
1CCP5 – C1CCP5 
KCCP5
(1)
0 0 ⋯
V2B – C2B 
K B
V
2CCP1 – C2CCP1 
KCCP1
⋯
V
2CCP5 – C2CCP5 
KCCP5
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
Θ=
VB1 – CB1 
K
1
VB2 – CB2 
K
2
⋯ 0
VBCCP1 – CBCCP1 
KCCP1
⋯ 0
VCCP11 
K
1
VCCP12 
K
2
⋯ 0 0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0
VCCP 52 
K
2
⋯
VCCP 5B 
K B
0 ⋯ 0
Here Vij > 0 is the variation margin (as determined in Step 3 of Table 1) to be paid from i to j as i is 
out-of-the-money and Cij > 0 is the collateral posted by i to j as the initial margin (in the prefunding Step 1 in 
Table 1). Thus, pair wise between banks, only the positive residual obligations such as (V
12
 – C
1B ) > 0  
are included in the matrix Θ. The same is the case for bank to CCP elements with V
1CCP5
 – C
1CCP5
 > 0.  
In the case of CCPs, if for example, CCP
1
 is out of the money vis-à-vis clearing member 1, as no initial margin is 
assumed to be paid by CCPs to clearing members, we have V CCP11 > 0 , as shown in the matrix Θ. Each bilateral 
uncollateralised exposure of a participant is expressed as a ratio of the resources of the participant. The latter 
is Tier 1 capital for each of the banks, denoted by Ki .
2 The CCP resources will typically be denoted as KCCP1. 
In Section 5 , we will consider two cases for KCCP1: pre skin‑in‑the‑game and post skin‑in‑the‑game.
The significance of the formulation of the matrix Θ in (1) for driving the rates of failure denoted as ui
L for each 
of the participants i in the network is that it can be defined as a dynamical system. Using matrix notation:
 Uq+1 = [(1 – ρ)I + Θ’]Uq = QUq (2)
1 Note, the lower right hand bloc has no connectivity as the CCPs do not have direct links to one another.
2 In Heath, Kelly et al. (2016), bank i ’s resources, Ki, i ’s Tier 1 capital is adjusted for bank i ’s contributions to any CCP default funds. Thus, this 
framework allows for the new EMIR (2014) rule for this.
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to counterparties derivatives positions as the 
latter constitutes a subset, rather than the whole 
balance sheet. From Table 2, this corresponds 
to USD 263 billion in permissible losses in 2015. 
If a similar 10% loss threshold is used to proxy the 
maximum that a CCP can use of its pre‑calibrated 
default fund under conditions of stress, then system 
stability requires that the systemic risk index given 
by �max of the stability matrix (see Box 1) cannot 
exceed 10% loss threshold.16
Table 4 shows that compared to 2012, the global 
derivatives markets in 2015‑end is relatively 
more stable with lower systemic risk index, 
T4  Systemic Risk Index and CCP skin‑in‑the‑game (SIG) fund to stabilise the system at 10% 
default fund loss threshold with 2.6 volatility stress for variation margin (2012 and 2015)
2012 2015 
Systemic Risk Index: �max
(See Box 1) 0.163* 0.148
Default Fund USD bns
Precalibrated 
Cover 2 **
SIG (USD bns) Default Fund USD bns
Precalibrated Cover 2
SIG (USD bns)
1 2 3 4
CCP1 (Rates) 3.86 14.28 6.87 10.03
CCP2 (Forex) 0.45 1.19 1.75 2.15
CCP3 (Equity) 1.63 14.45 1.58 1.66
CCP4 (Credit) 0.84 2.11 0.29 1.74
CCP5 (Commodities) 0.17 0.43 0.21 0.57
Total 6.95 32.46 10.7 16.15
*For 2012 Scenario 1 case, see Heath, Kelly et al. (2016) Table 9 for the systemic risk index and Table 6 for default fund**.
In (2) rates of failure for each participant in vector Uq+1 is given by the matrix of counterparty exposures 
relative to buffers and the (1 – ρ) is the extent to which i ’s buffers are constrained from being used.
The system stability of (2) that can evaluated by the power iteration algorithm in (3), implies that the maximum 
eigenvalue of Θ denoted by λmax (Θ) is less than ρ . If not the system will become unstable and participants 
can fail from an arbitrary size shock and with no outside interventions.
 Uq = Q
qU0 → λmax (Θ) < ρ. (3)
Thus, (3) defines the tipping point and λmax is the systemic risk index for system failure. In (2) and (3), 
ρ corresponds to the same cure rate or the regulatory loss threshold (%) of i ’s buffers that can be used to offset 
losses from exposures to counterparties given in matrix Θ ’. Using the eigenvalue equation λ
max
v R = Θ v R, we 
have the recursive solution for the right eigenvector centrality of each node in the system, while λ
max
v L = Θ’ v L  
gives the left eigenvector centrality. Following, Newman (2010, p. 651), λ
max
 (Θ) gives the % loss of resources 
in system as a whole from cascade failure and the product of the i th right eigenvector and λ
max
 gives the % 
loss of resources that i can potentially cause in the near term and so is a measure of systemic importance. 
Likewise, the product of the i th left eigenvector centrality and λ
max
 gives the % loss of i ’s own resources 
and hence is the systemic vulnerability index. Thus, unlike averages based on simulated stress test losses, 
these indices are internally consistent. The same goes for the skin-in-the-game recursive solutions which 
targets the λ
max
 of the transformed networks to achieve no more than λ
max
=10% of system wide losses by 
augmenting CCP resources, KCCP c=1 to 5 in matrix Θ, by SIG funds proportionate to the respective eigenvector 
centralities of the CCPs. This is reported in Table 4 columns 2 and 4.
16 The specification of loss 
thresholds are critical in the 
spectral stability analysis 
and also in Furfine (2003) 
simulated contagion stress 
tests. The following error is often 
commonplace: networks based 
on a subset of banks’ balance 
sheets are calibrated and 
then an inappropriately large 
percentage of Tier 1 capital loss 
threshold is assumed when 
defining bank “failure” in the 
contagion stress test. A lack 
of direct contagion is reported 
when losses from counterparties 
arising from a subset of the 
balance sheet may not exceed 
all of Tier 1 capital or a large 
percentage of Tier 1 capital. 
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�max, at 0.148 when compared to 0.163 in 2012 
for 2.67 volatility stress. In 2015, Table 4 shows 
the �max= 14.8% signals that some 14.8% 
of total capital and default fund resources 
could be lost while the loss threshold is 10%. 
The spectral approach shows there can be 
instability and contagion losses with respect to 
the failure of those participants which have right 
eigenvector centrality times �max that is greater 
than 10% (see Box 1) as shown in Chart 3a.
In the case of CCP buffers against clearing 
member exposures, we consider two cases. In 
the pre skin‑in‑the‑game case, CCPs only 
have the default fund to buffer exposures to the 
uncollateralised realised residual liabilities of their 
clearing members. In the post skin‑in‑the‑game case, 
the default fund for each of the CCPs will be 
augmented by a surcharge which is recursively 
estimated (see Markose, 2012 and Box 1) to be 
proportionate to the left eigenvector centrality 
of CCPs representing their vulnerability/exposure 
to clearing members. When modelled within 
a framework of failure rates for the financial 
institutions brought about by the erosion of their 
capital buffers, the left eigenvector centrality 
based capital surcharges targeting the CCPs will 
be internally consistent, as a fixed point result,17 
with the allocations being assigned to all CCPs 
given extant distribution of liabilities and buffers 
of other participants. Further, the CCP capital 
surcharges have to be made to satisfy a certain level 
of maximum eigenvalue for the network as whole, 
which is 10% to correspond to the loss threshold. 
Thus, we assume that the skin‑in‑the‑game CCP 
buffers have to kick in with only a 10% hit on 
the CCP default fund being permissible. The latter 
can be regarded to be a proxy for the default 
17 Gauthier et al. (2012) have 
underscored the importance of 
determining capital allocations 
that are fixed point solutions 
and are internally consistent. 
However, they did not use 
network analytics for this.
C3  2015 Before and after skin‑in‑the‑game (SIG) fund cases for contagion  
“failure” of top systemically important G‑SIB (loss threshold of 10% for G‑SIB and CPP Buffers)
a) Before SIG fund system unstable b)  After SIG fund: stabilised at �max just below 0.10
 
Source: Hybrid OTC-CCP derivatives network based on 2015 MAGD G-SIB data.
Note: Distressed units in black when 10% loss threshold is breached; green units suffer some losses that are less than this threshold.
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fund contributions of the two most systemically 
important clearing members. In other words, 
the SIG is modelled to precede any further use 
of the default fund beyond a 10% loss.
Table 4 columns 2 and 4 give the SIG funds 
needed for each of the CCPs to stabilise the 
pre‑SIG networks for 2012 and 2015, respectively, 
to achieve �max below 0.10. As a result, as shown 
in Chart 3b for the after SIG case, there is 
no distress when the most systemically important 
bank (see Chart 2a) is subject to a Furfine (2003) 
type failure. Further, Table 4 shows that in 2015 
a SIG fund of USD 16.15 billion will suffice 
to restore stability to the system while in 2012 
a SIG fund of USD 32.46 billion is needed to 
do the same.
Finally, it must be clear as to what “failure” or 
distress (nodes in black in Chart 3a) means in the 
contagion analysis. The contagion/domino losses 
stemming from the default on the derivatives 
positions of the Furfine trigger bank exceeds 
the 10% loss threshold that has been assumed for 
all participants. Thus, the default of Barclays on 
its variation margin (net of its prefunded initial 
margins) clearly breaches 10% of the default funds 
of CCP1 and CCP 5 directly. Indirectly, in Chart 3a, 
each of these CCPs cause a Tier 1 capital loss of 
more than 10% for Nomura as the non‑payment by 
the CCPs to the in‑the‑money positions of Nomura 
is booked as a loss in Nomura’s derivatives assets. 
This leads to some distress in CCP4.
5| Concluding remarks
A case has been made for why it is essential to 
make systemic risk assessments for CCPs in a 
comprehensive network setting that reflects the 
hybrid structure of G‑SIB dealers handling OTC 
positions as well as being clearing members of 
multiple CCPs.
In this note, we have updated the MAGD 
based G‑SIB derivatives data from 2012 to 2015 
in Table 2 and applied identical calculations (as in 
Heath, Kelly et al., 2016) for the prefunded 
initial margins and default fund contributions of 
clearing members for the five CCPs, reported in 
Table 3. This has provided interesting comparisons. 
The analysis shows considerable improvements 
in the stability of the hybrid derivatives 
network with the spectral systemic risk indexes 
in Table 4 showing smaller numbers for 2015 
as compared to 2012. This is clearly the result of 
the USD 100 trillion compression of derivatives in 
terms of notional and an over 30 % reduction in 
their fair values. Nevertheless, the global derivatives 
network in 2015 still remains unstable even 
under 2.6 volatility stress. The proof of concept is 
given of how skin‑in‑the‑game for each of the CCPs 
can be determined to mitigate potential contagion 
with the before and after SIG contagion results 
given in Charts 3a and 3b, respectively. The SIG has 
been designed to kick in after only 10% of CCPs’ 
default funds have been eroded by the failure of most 
systemically important G‑SIB to pay its residual 
uncollateralised variation margin. Chart 3a shows 
how this directly causes distress in two CCPs at once. 
The absence of such network based spectral systemic 
risk analytics is a major drawback for determining 
if a time series of snap shots based on bilateral 
contractual obligations relative to their prefunded 
resources are contagion prone or not. Further, 
we also need assessment of systemic importance 
and vulnerability of financial participants 
of these crucial markets.
While some progress has been made on data 
disclosures by CCPs (CPMI‑IOSCO, 2015), 
G‑SIBs and other participants in global derivatives 
market, it is our view that this falls far short of what is 
needed to create digital snap shots of holistic maps of 
financial interconnectedness (see also Brunnermeier 
et al., 2013) which can mitigate model risk from 
calibration of derivatives positions of G‑SIBs.
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